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I. INTRODUCTION
The need for regulators to manage changing economic conditions and
technology in the telecommunications industry has given rise to access
regimes characterized by broad guidelines and considerable flexibility for
the regulator. The incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs") sought to
challenge this broad discretion in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission,' which required the Supreme Court to
scrutinize the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Implementation of the
Local Competition Provision in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First
Report and Order ("Local Competition Provisions").2 Two issues before the
Court were (1) the legality of using forward-looking economic cost for
setting rates for interconnection or leasing of network elements and further,
the legality of defining forward-looking economic cost through the total
element long-run incremental cost ("TELRIC") of the element which
measures costs through a hypothetically efficient network; and (2) whether
a rate-setting methodology could amount to a 'taking' for the purposes of
the Fifth Amendment, which states "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation" (the "Takings Clause").3
This Article draws on the Supreme Court decision in Verizon to argue
that the intersection of ambiguous telecommunications access statutes and
the limits on judicial review as a result of the separation of powers and the
application of Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.4 mean that administrative law has become an ineffective tool in
ensuring the accountability of telecommunications regulators.
Telecommunications regulation has become too reliant on regulatory
expertise, and in the process, has ceded control over a vital area of
economic policy to the regulator.5 A dearth of regulator accountability can
give rise to a technocratic approach that undermines democratic
governance. This Article argues for Congress to address access pricing in
1. 535 U.S. 467 (2002).
2. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, First Report and Order, II F.C.C.R. 15499, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1996)
[hereinafter Local Competition Provisions].
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Court also addressed the provisions on unbundling and
combining network elements to determine when an incumbent is required to combine
network elements for a new entrant and when a combination is not technically feasible. This
issue is not discussed in this article as it does not relate to access pricing.
4. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
5. See Stephen Labaton, F.C.C. Ruling is Expected to Favor Bells, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
20, 2003, at CI ("[T]he rules that govern how much the Bell companies can charge their
rivals-is one of the most important policy issues in Washington affecting the competitive
landscape of the telephone markets.").
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greater detail. If further guidance is not provided, the Article argues, further
challenges to TELRIC based on the Takings Clause and the Supreme
Court's rate-setting cases can be expected. The limits on judicial review
that are embodied in Chevron do not apply to the enforcement of a
fundamental constitutional guarantee such as the Takings Clause. It follows
that this constitutional protection will be more frequently invoked to
establish a "just compensation" floor as a brake on the lack of regulator
accountability.
II. U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION
The deregulation of the U.S. Telecommunications industry took place
through the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which amended the
Communications Act of 1934.6 The application of the rules varies
depending upon whether an entity is an ILEC, or a new entrant, referred to
in the legislation as a competitive local exchange carrier ("CLEC").
A. Deregulation Framework
There are two types of rules. The first type may be described as the
necessary conditions for a CLEC to enter the local call market, which apply
equally to ILECs and CLECs. The rules require mandatory interconnection
for the exchange of traffic to overcome the natural monopoly.7
Interconnection must be provided at any technically feasible point, must be
at least equal in quality to that provided by the ILEC to itself and must be
provided according to rates, terms, and conditions that are
nondiscriminatory . 8
The second type of rules aim to remove an ILEC's economic
advantages flowing from its monopoly position by making it easier for
CLEC's to enter the market. ILECs must unbundle network elements to
allow CLECs to lease them,9 and resell them so that the CLEC can buy
6. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (2000). For an overview of the 1996 Act, see Deonne L.
Bruning, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: The Challenge of Competition, 30
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1255 (1997); Thomas W. Hazlett, Economic and Political
Consequences of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1359 (1999); Thomas
W. Hazlett, Explaining the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Comment on Thomas G.
Krattenmaker, 29 CONN. L. REV. 217 (1996) [hereinafter Hazlett Comment]; Thomas G.
Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 1 (1996); Michael
I. Meyerson, Ideas of the Marketplace: A Guide to the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 49
FED. CoMM. L.J. 251 (1997); and Glen 0. Robinson, The "New" Communications Act: A
Second Opinion, 29 CONN. L. REV. 289 (1996).
7. 47 U.S.C. § 251(a), (c) (2000).
8. Id. § 251(b)(2).
9. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).
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service in bulk, brand it, and sell it under its own name.' ° A network
element must be unbundled if it is necessary and if a lack of access to it
would impair the CLEC's ability to offer the service."
As a result, competition in the local market may be achieved through
either a CLEC building its own network and relying on the first type of
rules (facilities-based competition), operating as a pure reseller using the
second type of rules, or using a hybrid of both approaches whereby a
CLEC uses some of its own facilities and leases the unbundled network
elements that it lacks so as to combine them into a complete service. 12
B. Access Pricing
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 provided for rates to be either
negotiated or set by state commissions.' 3 The Act provided for the "just and
reasonable rate" for interconnection pursuant to Section 251 (c)(2) and rates
for unbundled network elements pursuant to Section 251(c)(3) to be
determined by state commissions on the basis that they "shall be ... based
on the cost (determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-
based proceeding) of providing the interconnection or network element
(whichever is applicable), and ... nondiscriminatory, and ... may include
a reasonable profit."' 4
The Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC's") Local
Competition Provisions gave effect to Congress's mandate by ruling that
the state commissions should set arbitrated rates for interconnection and
access to unbundled elements pursuant to a forward-looking economic
cost-pricing methodology. The FCC's pricing methodology provided for a
new entrant seeking access to a network element of an ILEC to pay (1) any
costs directly attributable to the CLECs' use (incremental or marginal
costs); (2) a proportional share of the depreciation in the elements value
from use over time; (3) a proportional share of joint and common costs,
otherwise called overhead costs, associated with element use (i.e.,
personnel costs, billing costs, etc.); and (4) a share of the cost of the capital
10. 47 U.S.c. § 251(b)(1), (c)(4).
11. Id. § 251(d)(2); Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 3696, 18 Comm.
Reg. ( P & F) 888 (1999).
12. Verizon Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 491-92 (2002); Local Competition
Provisions, supra note 2, para. 12.
13. 47 U.S.C. § 252(a); Verizon, 535 U.S. at 492.
14. 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1)(A)-(B).
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invested in the network element (either interest paid or the foregone returns
on alternative investments), which is equivalent to a reasonable profit.15
The FCC also considered three alternative access pricing theories.
The FCC determined that the Telecommunications Act did not specify
whether historical/embedded costs should be included in setting prices.
However, the FCC decided that when calculating rates under TELRIC, it
would not consider the embedded costs of facilities in place before
February 8, 1996, the date of the Act's passage.6 Embedded costs include
any portion of the fixed costs of building the network that the incumbent
has not yet recovered through its service prices. The FCC adopted this
approach on the basis that adopting historical cost measures would
advantage ILECs and hinder competition.
The FCC excluded opportunity cost from TELRIC as part of the
rejection of an Efficient Component Pricing Rule ("ECPR"). The FCC
defined ECPR as pricing an input at the incremental cost of that input plus
the opportunity costs that the ILEC incurs when the new entrant provides
the services instead of the incumbent. The rejection was based on ECPR
not being cost based and having no ability to move prices towards a
competitive level, thus hampering the development of competition. 7
The FCC also ruled out the use of 'Ramsey Pricing" 8 because it
would allocate common costs in inverse proportion to the sensitivity of
demand for various network elements and services. This type of allocation
could limit the extent of entry into local exchange markets by allocating
more costs to, and thus raising the prices of, the most critical bottleneck
inputs, the demand for which tends to be relatively inelastic. A
methodology which hampers market entry is inconsistent with the Act's
goals.1 9
Additionally, the FCC decided that, at any point in time, the total
element long-run incremental cost of an element should be measured based
on the use of the most efficient telecommunications technology currently
available and the lowest cost network configuration given the existing
15. Local Competition Provisions, supra note 2, paras. 672-82, 699-700; 47 C.F.R. §
51.505 (2003).
16. 47 C.F.R. §51.505(d)(1); Local Competition Provisions, supra note 2, paras. 705,
707.
17. Local Competition Provisions, supra note 2, paras. 708-10.
18. Ramsey pricing is based on the principle that goods should be taxed or priced
according to demand, so that taxes or prices should be higher as to goods for which demand
is relatively inelastic. See F. P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37
ECON. J. 47 (1927).
19. See Local Competition Provisions, supra note 2, para. 696.
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location of the ILEC's wire centers.2 ° TELRIC included the costs explained
above, except that they were based not on the costs associated with the
ILEC's actual network, but on the costs associated with a hypothetically
efficient network.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REVIEWING
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACCESS PRICES
A. The Verizon Decision
The Supreme Court examined the FCC's interpretation of the
Telecommunications Act in accordance with the standard in Chevron,
which involves a two step approach. First, does the statute clearly answer
the interpretive inquiry? If so, apply the statute by its terms to affirm or
reverse the agency. If not, the Court adopts a position of deference towards
the agency and will only reject an interpretation if it is "unreasonable."'"
The FCC's rule adopting TELRIC was initially challenged in Iowa
Utilities Board v. Federal Communications Commission,22 where the
Eighth Circuit upheld the choice of a forward-looking methodology, 23 but
struck down the rule defining TELRIC as being based upon the use of a
hypothetically efficient network.24 Both issues were before the Supreme
Court in Verizon.
The Supreme Court found that the FCC could require state
commissions to set the rates charged by incumbents for leased elements on
a forward-looking basis unrelated to the incumbents' investment. The
Court focused on the term "cost" in the statute25 and found that apart from a
20. Local Competition Provisions, supra note 2, at para. 685; 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(1).
21. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat'l Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
318 (2000).
22. 219 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2000).
23. The court stated:
We conclude the term "cost," as it is used in the statute, is ambiguous, and
Congress has not spoken directly on the meaning of the word in this context....
The FCC has the authority to make rules to fill any gap in the Act left by
Congress, provided the agency's construction of the statute is reasonable.
Id. at 751-52.
24. The court found that the FCC violated the plain meaning of the Act:
It is clear from the language of the statute that Congress intended the rates to be
"based on the cost... of providing the interconnection or network element," not
on the cost some imaginary carrier would incur by providing the newest, most
efficient, and least cost substitute for the actual item or element which will be
furnished by the existing ILEC pursuant to Congress's mandate for sharing.
Id. at 750 (citation omitted).
25. 47 U.S.C. §252(d)(1) (2000).
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prohibition against rate of return or other rate-based proceedings, the term
was a chameleon capable of multiple interpretations.26 In particular, the
Court noted that the Act used "cost" as an intermediate term in the
calculation of "just and reasonable rates" and that historically regulatory
bodies required to set rates expressed in these terms had ample discretion to
choose methodology.27 The Court thus rejected the incumbents' argument
that "cost" meant the past cost to an incumbent of furnishing the actual
network element to be physically provided, as distinct from its value or the
price that would be paid for it on the open market.28 Because the statute
was ambiguous and because the deference to the FCC was not defeated by
the incumbent's showing of unreasonableness, the Supreme Court upheld
the Eighth Circuit's ruling, which allowed a forward-looking
methodology.29
Justice Souter, for the majority, then addressed whether TELRIC's
calculation of forward-looking cost by reference to a hypothetical, most
efficient element at existing wire centers, not the actual network element
being provided, meant that TELRIC was neither consistent with the plain
language of Section 252(d)(1) nor within the zone of reasonable
interpretation subject to Chevron deference. Justice Souter found the
legislation to be ambiguous based on his earlier finding that the term "cost"
was ambiguous.30 The analysis lasts one paragraph but it appears that
Justice Souter interpreted the ILEC's argument that a hypothetical network
was an impermissible standard, as equating with an argument that only the
actual or historical network was allowed under the Act. Because "cost" did
not equate with historical cost, then the "network" did not have to be the
actual or historical network.3' Justice Souter then proceeded to step two of
Chevron and determined that the FCC's resolution of the ambiguity was
reasonable. Justice Souter reached this conclusion on the basis that rate-
26. Verizon Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 500 (2002).
27. Id. (referring to Fed. Power Comm'n. v. Hope Nat'l Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602
(1944) "[T]he Commission was not bound to the use of any single formula or combination
of formulae in determining rates.").
28. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 498-99.
29. Id. at 501; id. at 539 (Breyer, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 501.
31. Justice Souter placed emphasis on different words in § 252(d)(l)(A)(i) as compared
with the Eighth Circuit and therefore came up with a different interpretation and outcome.
Cf Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744, 750 (8th Cir. 2000). The Eighth Circuit put
emphasis on what was to be provided, and therefore interpreted "cost" as being "the cost ...
of providing the interconnection or network element," while Justice Souter focused on the
term "cost" by itself, which was open to a number of interpretations, except for the
prohibition on considering rate-of-return or other rate-based proceedings. Id. (citation
omitted).
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setting methodologies that must be "just and reasonable" are traditionally
within the discretion of the regulator.32 Nonetheless, Justice Souter
considered the incumbents' three arguments: (1) TELRIC may simulate the
competition envisioned by the Act but does not induce it; (2) TELRIC is
incapable of providing enough depreciation and allowance for capital costs
to induce rational competition on the theory's own terms; and (3) TELRIC
is needlessly and unreasonably complicated and impracticable. 33
The incumbents' most important argument was that, by setting rates
using hypothetical most efficient costs, the FCC would discourage
facilities-based competition, which is inconsistent with the objectives of the
Act. The incumbents argued that in purporting to set incumbents'
wholesale prices at the level that would exist in a perfectly competitive
market (in order to make retail prices similarly competitive), TELRIC sets
rates so low that entrants will always lease and never build network
elements. 34 Further, an entrant would be deterred from building a network
element more efficient than the best one on the market at that time (the one
assumed in setting the TELRIC rate), as its lower cost in building and
operating this new element would be immediately available to its
competitors. TELRIC is characterized by the incumbents as preventing
competition and instead fostering "parasitic free-riding." 35
Justice Souter dealt with this argument by pointing out that TELRIC
does not assume a perfectly efficient wholesale market but instead includes
several features of inefficiency that provide an incentive to build
telecommunications infrastructure. Some "network elements ... will not be
priced at their most efficient cost and configuration"36 because the FCC
requires "ratesetters to calculate cost on the basis of 'the existing location
32. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 501-02 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45, 866 (1984); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,
390 U.S. 747, 790 (1968) ("We must reiterate that the breadth and complexity of the
Commission's responsibilities demand that it be given every reasonable opportunity to
formulate methods of regulation appropriate for the solution of its intensely practical
difficulties.")).
33. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 503.
34. Justice Breyer illustrated this point through a new entrant seeking to provide local
services to a customer whose house may be accessed by the new entrant laying their own
cable, using a pre-existing electricity conduit, installing their own wireless system or using
the incumbent's pre-existing pair of twisted copper wires. It is then assumed that wireless or
the electricity conduit are the most efficient ways to provide the service. Under TELRIC and
using the hypothetical cost of the most efficient method, the FCC would require the
incumbent to provide access to its twisted copper wires at the cost of a hypothetical wireless
system so that there is no incentive to build the wireless system. Id. at 547, 549-50.
35. Id. at 504.
36. Id. at 505.
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of the incumbent['s] wire centers."' 37 Further, TELRIC rates in practice
will differ from the outcome of a perfectly competitive market owing to
lags in price adjustments built into the rate setting process. The state
commissions that set rates do so for three- or four-year periods so that the
rate is constant while the new entrant works to produce a lower cost. In
addition, the new entrant's lower cost may take time to impact the market
due to the need to install equipment, conduct marketing, and convince
consumers to switch services.
3 8
Justice Souter also disputed the argument that a competitor would not
invest because it would have to give access to other competitors. TELRIC
is based on the use of the most efficient telecommunications technology
currently available, so that "the marginal cost of a most efficient element
that a new entrant alone has built and uses would not set a new pricing
standard" until it was generally available. 39 To Justice Souter's response it
may also be observed that the statute does not require new entrants to lease
their network elements to competitors, only incumbents are subject to this
requirement pursuant to Section 251(c)(3). Further, Justice Souter points
out that the entrants invested $55 billion in new facilities from 1996
through 2000, so that in fact facilities-based competition was taking
place.40
The next step in the reasoning of the majority was to evaluate the
alternative pricing models, embedded-cost methodologies, an efficient
component pricing rule, and "Ramsey pricing," that the FCC considered
and rejected.4' Justice Souter explained that each of the alternatives shared
the characteristic of "includ[ing] ... additional costs beyond what would be
most efficient in the long run. '"42 The incumbents argued that this increase
in costs meant that there was greater incentive for a new entrant to build its
own facilities with lower marginal costs. Further, the incumbent faced with
such competition would have an incentive to innovate and reduce its
37. Id. (citation omitted).
38. Id. at 505-06.
39. Id. at 506.
40. Id. at 516.
41. Id. at 508.
42. Id. Other reasons for rejecting the alternatives were: (1) embedded cost
methodologies allow for the passing of inefficiencies (i.e., poor management or poor
investment decisions) onto competitors and the manipulation of book costs to overstate the
costs to be recovered, (2) the Efficient Component Pricing Rule ("ECPR") incorporates
opportunity costs based on retail prices from a monopolistic local exchange market rather
than efficient marginal costs and lacks any mechanism to move prices towards competitive
levels, and (3) Ramsey pricing increases the prices of inelastic goods which would be the
bottleneck elements so that those elements least capable of being duplicated would be the
most expensive to access. See id. at 511-16.
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marginal costs in response.43 Justice Souter rejected this argument on the
basis that TELRIC already had built-in inefficiencies because of the use of
existing wire center locations and the lag in price setting. Additionally, a
higher rate could prevent a competitor from initially entering the market,
thus reducing competition. 44
The incumbents' second reason for calling TELRIC an unreasonable
exercise of the FCC's regulatory discretion was its alleged inability to
provide enough depreciation and allowance for capital costs to induce
rational competition. The focus on marginal costs would mean that
incumbents would be unable to fully depreciate their equipment or obtain a
sufficient return on their investments.45 Justice Breyer also advanced the
argument that TELRIC will force incumbents to share their cost-reducing
innovations with competitors, but they will bear the cost of unsuccessful
investments alone.46 Justice Souter referred to the Local Competition
Provisions, which provided for incumbents to demonstrate the need for a
different risk-adjusted cost of capital or depreciation rate and also for state
commissions to make adjustments if warranted. Because states had the
discretion to make changes, it could not be said that the FCC's decision
was unreasonable.47
The incumbents' third argument was that TELRIC is needlessly and
unreasonably complicated and impracticable. Justice Souter observed that
under traditional rate-setting procedures, which had to determine an
incumbent's costs, involved an asymmetry of information that created its
own complexities. 48 The majority found that "battles of experts are bound
to be part of any ratesetting scheme, and the FCC was reasonable to prefer
TELRIC ....
Justice Breyer dissented on the reasonableness of TELRIC due to the
adoption of a hypothetically efficient network standard for determining
costs. He disagreed with the majority's finding that TELRIC is "authorized
43. Id. at 509.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 517.
46. Id. at 551 ("It makes no economic sense for the [incumbent] to invest in
technologies that lower its own marginal costs, so long as competitors can achieve the
identical cost savings by regulatory fiat." (quoting Thomas M. Jorde et al., Innovation,
Investment, and Unbundling, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 8 (2000))).
47. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 519-21.
48. Id. at 522.
49. Id.
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by the Act."5 He adopted a purposive analysis of the Act,5' and proceeded
directly to the second step of Chevron after rejecting the Eighth Circuit's
plain meaning interpretation. He relied on Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. 5 2 to argue that the FCC's choice of TELRIC bears no
"rational connection" to the Act's deregulatory purpose. 53  The
reasonableness of an agency's interpretation is, therefore, weighed against
the statute's purpose. Justice Breyer argued that "[t]he primary goal of the
Telecommunications Act is to 'promote competition and reduce regulation'
in both local and long-distance telecommunications markets. 54 TELRIC
could not pass the second step of Chevron because the choice of TELRIC
was not reasonable in light of the purpose of the statute.5 ' The statute is
"not a ratemaking statute seeking better regulation. It is a deregulatory
statute seeking competition." 56 As a result it is not permissible to adopt the
current TELRIC methodology which combined "with a broad definition of
'network element' will tend to produce widespread sharing of entire
incumbent networks under regulatory supervision" rather than a
competitive market.5
Justice Breyer also provides a rejoinder to the majority's reasoning by
questioning whether the amount of investment by new entrants was in
facilities like broadband "for which an incumbent's historical network
offers no substitute" and by pointing out that what may have been invested
if another methodology was adopted is unknown.5 8 Further, a state
commission's ability to make changes to risk-adjusted cost of capital or
depreciation rates will not adequately ensure recovery of investments
unless the exception swallows the rule. The FCC's adoption of TELRIC as
the default rule means that changes should be reserved for special situations
and should not be employed to allow a back door method of using historic
50. Id. at 539.
51. Justice Souter's and Justice Breyer's approaches to reasonableness under Chevron
step two both rely on the use of intention, although they look to different sources for that
intent. Justice Souter's approach is a historical analysis that looks at where responsibility for
"just and reasonable" rate-setting decisions have traditionally been situated. Justice Breyer's
approach, on the other hand, focuses on the legislative purpose of the Act under review.
52. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
53. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 542 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass 'n, 463 U.S. at 56).
54. Id. at 539-40 (citing Telecommunications Act, Preamble, 110 Stat. 56 (1996); H. R.
CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 1 (1996)).
55. Id. at 541-42.
56. Id. at 543.
57. Id. at 550-51.
58. Id. at 552.
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CoSt. 59 Lastly, Justice Breyer argued that the reliance on "regulatory lag" is
an inadequate way in which to justify a pricing methodology as "lags will
differ, depending upon regulator, time, and circumstance, thereby
introducing a near random element that might, or might not, ameliorate the
system's otherwise adverse effects."'
The ambiguity of the access pricing provisions, the strictures of
Chevron deference, and the cogent reasoning of both Justice Souter and
Justice Breyer raises questions as to the utility of administrative law in
ensuring the accountability of the FCC.
B. Administrative Law and Access Pricing
Courts are required to ensure that an administrative body or regulator
is conducting its responsibilities in conformance with its legislative
mandate of enforcing the rule of law. 61 Equally, a regulator acts
legitimately if it stays within the parameters of its statutory authorizations.
Justice Souter in Verizon phrases the issue for courts as follows:
Whether the FCC picked the best way to set these rates is the stuff of
debate for economists and regulators versed in the technology of
telecommunications and microeconomic pricing theory. The job of
judges is to ask whether the Commission made choices reasonably
within the pale of statutory possibility in deciding what and how items
must be leased and the way to set rates for leasing them.62
However, it is also recognized that regulation requires discretion and
the application of expertise to solve social problems.63 Verizon questions
the courts' role in relation to regulators generally, and the FCC specifically,
if Chevron deference is taken as a given.64 This relationship is examined in
59. Id. at 555.
60. Id. at 561.
61. Nat'l Brdcst. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943) ("Our duty is at an end
when we find that the action of the Commission was ... pursuant to authority granted by
Congress."); Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Co., 332 U.S. 194, 207 (1947) ("[W]e are
free to disturb the Commission's conclusion only if it lacks any ... statutory foundation.").
62. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 539.
63. Aluminum Co. of America v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 390
(1984); Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991); see also Verizon, 535
U.S. at 542 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (also acknowledging the need for expertise).
64. The merits of Chevron deference have been examined on a number of occasions
and will not be revisited here. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in
Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113 (1998); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation
and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989);
Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling
Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary's Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. I
(2000); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency
Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301 (1988); Antonin Scalia,
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989);
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the context of Verizon's review of access pricing and the intersection
between the objectives of administrative law and the nature of
telecommunications.
The positions taken by Justice Souter and Justice Breyer illustrate the
difficulty in applying administrative law to the changing circumstances of
the telecommunications market. Justice Souter believed the Act's objective
was to open local markets to competition, which may be hampered by
allowing higher access rates that would force new entrants to build
infrastructure to compete, rather than seeking access, which could in turn
prevent a competitor from entering the market altogether due to the higher
cost of building, and thus reduce competition.6" Justice Souter then relied
on regulator discretion to correct any adverse outcomes from using a
hypothetical network.
Justice Breyer dissented, asserting that the legislative purpose behind
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was to achieve facilities-based
competition. This purpose is thwarted by giving access to services rather
than building a competing infrastructure. It does not result in a competitive
marketplace, but instead results in reregulation, as the regulator must
determine which services should be available for leasing and what access
prices should be charged for those services.
66
Both justices evaluated the FCC's actions against an objective of
promoting competition, but they assume different prevailing economic
conditions as to the local loop. Justice Souter assumes a continuing natural
monopoly, while Justice Breyer assumed the existence of competitive
alternatives. These two positions illustrate that technology and economic
conditions in telecommunications are in a state of flux. 67 For instance, at
certain times and locations the local loop will be essential to competition
but will exhibit bottleneck or natural monopoly characteristics so that the
development of a competing infrastructure is problematic. Equally, those
Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 821 (1990); Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON
REG. 283 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 2071 (1990).
65. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 509.
66. Id. at 543-44; see also Robert W. Crandall, A Somewhat Better Connection, 25
REGULATION 22 (2002) ("Local telephone companies are more highly regulated today than
25 years ago because they are now required to sell services to their competitors at
(regulated) cost-based prices.").
67. William H. Melody, Telecom Reform: Progress and Prospects, 23 TELECOMM.
POL'Y 7, 16-17 (1999) (explaining that there are competing schools of thought as to whether
telecommunications will become fully competitive and no longer need specific regulation or
whether continuing regulation will be required to deal with market failures); see also PETER
W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 89-90 (2nd ed. 1999).
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economic characteristics may be overcome as technological developments
create substitutes. The classic example is the Internet, which can now be
provided via cable, telephone, satellite, wireless, and public utilities. 68 As a
result, what is currently a bottleneck may cease to be so in the future. The
ability to make telephone calls over cable companies' broadband networks
or the increased penetration of wireless could make unbundling the local
loop unnecessary. 69 Although the telecommunications market is in flux, the
legislation that the Court must interpret is static.
The disorderly interactions between regulation, economic conditions,
and technology give rise to a range of policy choices that requires a
regulator with considerable expertise and flexibility to adjust regulations.7°
However, this must be balanced against the need for administrative
agencies to be made accountable through the rule of law and democratic
government. Administrative law is an attempt to constrain regulators'
discretion and avoid abuses, balanced against the need to leave the
regulatory experts sufficient freedom to pursue optimal outcomes.7 It is
also a product of the separation of powers between the judiciary, the
legislature, and the executive.72 As a result, accountability is achieved
through the legislature setting out a clear legislative framework so that a
court, through statutory interpretation, can ensure compliance with the
legislative mandate.73 The conflicting requirements of flexibility and
accountability means that there must be a compromise between these two
very important objectives. Too much faith in a regulator's expertise can
give rise to a technocratic approach that makes legal restraint difficult and
68. Barbara Esbin, Internet over Cable: Defining the Future in Terms of the Past, 7
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 37 (1999); Arlan Gates, Convergence and Competition:
Technological Change, Industry Concentration and Competition Policy in the
Telecommunications Sector, 58 U. TORONTO FAc. L. REV. 83, 87 (2000).
69. Seth A. Cohen, Deregulating, Defragmenting & Interconnecting: Reconsidering
Commercial Telecommunications Regulation in Relation to the Rise of Internet Telephony,
18 J.L. & COM. 133 (1998).
70. Id. at 148; Melody, supra note 67, at 31-33.
71. Andrew P. Morriss, Implications of Second-Best Theory for Administrative and
Regulatory Law: A Case Study of Public Utility Regulation, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 135, 186-
87 (1998).
72. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978) ("[l]n our constitutional
system the commitment to the separation of powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt
congressional action by judicially decreeing what accords with 'common sense and the
public weal.' Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches.").
73. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969,
1031 (1992); Abner J. Mikva, How Should the Courts Treat Administrative Agencies?, 36
AM. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1986); Starr, supra note 64, at 311-12; Harold J. Krent, Delegation and
Its Discontents: Power Without Responsibility, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 717 (1994) (book
review).
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undermines democratic governance.74 Equally, very prescriptive legislation
may overly inhibit a regulator." The compromise should never become so
great that one objective trumps the other, otherwise society would pay the
high price of either an unaccountable or an ineffective regulator.
Regulators thus retain the capacity to affect economic performance as
a whole and citizens' individual well-being to a great extent. It follows that
the regulator must be held accountable and there remains a role for courts
in monitoring a regulator's use of discretion. However, the limits on
judicial review as a consequence of respecting the separation of powers and
the requirements of Chevron means that courts can only provide
accountability when the legislature provides meaningful guidance to the
regulator and to the court. However, that guidance is limited in the case of
telecommunications, because regulators need the freedom to adapt to the
uncertainties of changes in economic conditions, technology, and behavior
of regulated firms. The combination of congressional delegation, the
separation of powers, and Chevron deference may create an accountability
abyss for regulators.76 The likelihood of an accountability abyss is
heightened in the complex and contentious area of telecommunications
because Congress legislates in generalities, and the court defers to
regulators' reasonable interpretations of those generalities.
One suggested approach to achieving a balance between
accountability and discretion is through the "re-missioning"77 of the
regulator at various intervals, allowing the legislature to revisit the
legislative mandate and make amendments. However, this solution is not
without problems. It assumes that the legislature can perceive the need and
direction for "re-missioning" on a timely basis, which may not be
possible.78 The legislature may be overly reliant on the regulator's expertise
74. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 132-134
(1980); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Future of Administrative Law, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 769,
772, 774 (1991) (reviewing Christopher F. Edley, Jr., Administrative Law: Rethinking
Judicial Control of Bureaucracy (1990)).
75. Ely, supra note 74, at 182-83.
76. Concerns over an accountability void have been expressed by a number of authors.
See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American
Trucking Ass'ns, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 452, 452-53 (2002) (arguing for filling the void by
requiring regulators to set standards for their exercise of discretion); and Farina, supra note
64, at 456, 464-66, 514 (arguing that Chevron has further shifted responsibility for regulator
accountability to the President, which created a power imbalance that the Supreme Court
should redress).
77. Phil Weiser, Paradigm Changes in Telecommunications Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L.
REV. 819, 837-38 (2000); see also William H. Read & Ronald Alan Weiner, FCC Reform:
Governing Requires a New Standard, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 289 (1997).
78. Mikva, supra note 73, at 7.
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and may make amendments in response to the regulator's requests without
giving enough weight to alternative views.79 Alternatively, to avoid
deciding a controversial issue or to covertly benefit an interest group,
policy decisions may be deliberately delegated to the regulator.8 ° Indeed,
access pricing's ability to shift resources between ILECs, CLECs, and the
public may be why the issue was delegated to the FCC. Nonetheless, as
Congress is the democratically-elected body that represents the people and
has legislative or lawmaking powers, it is the branch of government that
must begin the accountability process.8 Although the Supreme Court
"say[s] what the law is,"82 and the President "take[s] Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed, 83 in the regulatory state, these important roles
presuppose a legislative mandate.
The Telecommunications Act's brief reference to "cost" and the
Supreme Court's identification of multiple meanings for that term
demonstrates that an issue as important as access pricing should be
prescribed in more detail by the legislature. Although no statute can be
entirely precise, the current legislative mandate falls far short of giving a
desirable degree of direction to the FCC.' Congress could provide greater
guidance, without overly compromising the FCC's discretion, by
elaborating on whether "cost" is historical cost or forward-looking cost
(marginal cost) and specifying whether "cost" is to be determined by
reference to an actual or most efficient network design. Alternatively,
Congress could express a preference for access prices that promote price
competition or the promotion of innovation. If Congress does not give
greater guidance, then administrative law under Chevron will not achieve
regulator accountability, leaving the private sector with only the Takings
Clause to define "just and reasonable rates." Equating "just and reasonable
79. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory
of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1245 (1989).
80. Id.; Ely, supra note 74, at 131; Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 381 (1989); Peter L. Strauss, Legislative
Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427, 428-30
(1989); see also Chevron v. Nat'l Resource Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(commenting that Congress may have wanted the administrator to accommodate conflicting
policies or was unable to build a consensus for the drafting of the legislation).
81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
82. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
83. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
84. Douglas Lichtman and Randal C. Picker, Entry Policy in Local
Telecommunications: Iowa Utilities and Verizon, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 65 (2002),
("[G]iven the vague language used in the [Telecommunications] Act, virtually anything the
Commission had put forward in terms of its pricing methodology would have fallen within
the scope of Chevron deference.").
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rates" with "just compensation" requires an examination of the Takings
Clause doctrine as it is applied to telecommunications access prices.
IV. TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE AND REVIEWING
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACCESS PRICES
A. Takings and Telecommunications Before Verizon
The Supreme Court originally only applied the Takings Clause to
direct government appropriations of private property or physical invasions
that effectively divested the owner of possession. 5 The Supreme Court
subsequently recognized two types of takings that can arise without a
physical occupation. First, rate regulation may effect a taking if the rate is
set so low as to be confiscatory.86 Second, government regulation that
"goes too far" in limiting the owner's use of his or her property
(noninvasive regulatory takings) may result in a taking.8 7 In the
telecommunications access sphere ILECs raised all three areas of takings
jurisprudence in the FCC's Local Competition Provisions to support their
argument that TELRIC was unconstitutional.88
The takings issue also arose in academic circles with the coining of
the new phrase "Deregulatory Takings" 89 and its subsequent critique. 90 The
proponents of deregulatory takings, J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F.
85. Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and
Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885, 933-34 (2003) (citing Tahoe-Sierra
Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,325 n.21 (2002)).
86. Id. (citing Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597
(1896)).
87. Id. (quoting Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922)).
88. Local Competition Provisions, supra note 2, paras. 670, 736, 737, 740.
89. J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE
REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN
THE UNITED STATES (1998) [hereinafter DEREGULATORY TAKINGS 1]; J. Gregory Sidak &
Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 851 (1996) [hereinafter Deregulatory Takings 2]; J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F.
Spulber, Givings, Takings and the Fallacy of Forward-Looking Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1068 (1997).
90. William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Deregulatory Takings, Breach of the
Regulatory Contract, end the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1037
(1997); William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Does the Constitution Require That We
Kill the Competitive Goose? Pricing Local Phone Services to Rivals, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1122 (1998); Jim Chen, The Second Coming of Smyth v. Ames, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1535
(1999); Stephen F. Williams, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract:
A Comment, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1000 (1996); Oliver E. Williamson, Deregulatory Takings
and Breach of the Regulatory Contract: Some Precautions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1007 (1996);
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Takings Clause and Improvident Regulatory Bargains, 108 YALE
L. J. 801 (1999) (book review).
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Spulber, argue, in short, that a regulatory contract exists between regulators
and regulated firms which promises that the regulated firms will be able to
recover a competitive return on their investments that were undertaken at
the behest of the regulator. The failure to set access prices which honor that
commitment results in a taking. Further, although deregulation is aimed at
promoting competition to benefit consumers, the rights of ILECs and their
investors may be compromised, leading to the observation that "the
predictable appeal that competition holds for legislators and regulators
should not obscure the fact that the transition from regulated monopoly to
competition, like the transition from dirty air to clean, is not free." 91
The most relevant category of takings jurisprudence relates to rate
setting. The regulation of rates chargeable for the employment of private
assets for public uses is constitutionally permissible, 92 although the charge
cannot be so unjust as to be confiscatory.93 The case of Federal Power
Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Company stands for the proposition that
a court should look at the total effect of the rate order. 94 Further, a taking
would only arise when the rate endangered a firm's survival, or prevented
successful operations (i.e., an inability to maintain its financial integrity) to
attract capital, and to compensate its investors for the risks assumed.95 In
Duquesne Light Company v. Barasch, the Supreme Court reiterated the
need to look at the net effect of a rate order and focused on whether the
investors' rate of return from investing in the entire business was
commensurate with the risk of that type of business. As the rate orders did
not show a failure to give a reasonable rate of return on equity given the
risks of the regime, there was no taking. 96
In Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel v. Federal Communications
Commission,97 the Fifth Circuit approached the deregulatory takings issue
from the rate-setting perspective by contrasting one ILEC's claim that a
regulated entity cannot be forced to operate one segment of its business at a
loss on the expectation that it can make up the shortfalls from another
competitive line of business,98 with the FCC response that the ILEC must
91. Deregulatory Takings 2, supra note 89, at 861.
92. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 133-134 (1877).
93. See Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sanford, 164 U.S. 578, 597 (1896).
94. 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944).
95. Id. at 605.
96. 488 U.S. 299, 315 (1989).
97. 183 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 530
U.S. 1213, cert. denied 531 U.S. 975 (2000).
98. The ILEC relied on Brooks-Scanlon v. Railroad Commission, 251 U.S. 396 (1920),
where the Court did not look at the whole enterprise but only at the railway branch of the
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show that a taking will "necessarily" result from the regulatory actions and
the ILEC must demonstrate that its losses are so significant that the "net
effect" is confiscatory. 99 The Fifth Circuit rejected the takings claim as the
ILEC could not satisfy the requirements of Duquesne, because it could not
demonstrate any loss of revenue, let alone enough of a loss to constitute a
taking.
B. Takings and Telecommunications After Verizon
In Verizon, the incumbents sought to rely on a rule of constitutional
avoidance' °° to argue that "cost" should be construed by reference to
historical investment to avoid a serious constitutional question: whether
TELRIC leads to a taking of property in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. 10 A unanimous Court addressed the incumbents' argument in
terms of the above rate-setting cases, and it found that the result rather than
the methodology must be examined so that the takings question was not
ripe.W2 Further, the ILECs made no argument that TELRIC jeopardized
their financial integrity or that it failed to provide adequate compensation to
current equity holders for the risk associated with their investments, so that
TELRIC could not be shown to be confiscatory. 0 3 Lastly, the Court
rebuffed the idea of a regulatory contract creating some expectation that
historical cost would be used by observing that "no such promise was ever
made."' As a result, it is clear that the rate-setting category of takings
jurisprudence is applicable to access pricing, but to succeed in showing a
taking, an ILEC must demonstrate the firm's operations will be rendered
unsuccessful'0 5 or the rate fails to give a reasonable rate of return on equity
given the risks of the regime. 1
0 6
Verizon did not consider the other two categories of takings
jurisprudence. The noninvasive regulatory takings category is applied
through a three factor test that weighs the following considerations: (1)
"economic impact of the regulation on the claimant," (2) "extent to which
business. It concluded that a business cannot be compelled to operate other components of
its business, here a sawmill and lumber business, to maintain the railroad for others' use.
99. Texas Pub. Util. Counsel, 183 F.3d at 413 n.14, 437.
100. Legislation ought not be construed to violate the Constitution if any other possible
construction remains available. See Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979).
101. Verizon Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 523 (2002).
102. Id. at 523-25, 539 (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
103. Id. at 525-28.
104. Id. at 528.
105. Federal Power Comm'n. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 605 (1944).
106. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 315 (1989).
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the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,"
and (3) "character of the governmental action." ' 7 The distinct investment-
backed expectations criterion limited takings to situations where the
property owner could demonstrate that they purchased their property in
reliance on a state of affairs that did not include the regulatory regime. If an
owner bought property with knowledge of the regime then they "have
assumed the risk of any economic loss. ' '1°8
The ILECs argue that the historical regulation of telecommunications
created expectations that investments in specialized facilities would make
compensatory returns.' 09 The category has been argued to be inapplicable
to access pricing because it is concerned with balancing financial burdens
between a property owner and the public in general, while a
telecommunications investor is able to spread risk and mitigate losses
through an investment portfolio that the owner of physical property cannot
do." ' Further, the finding in Verizon that there was no promise that could
create the expectation that historical cost would be used suggests the lack
of any interference with investment-backed expectations. Nonetheless,
whether noninvasive regulatory takings law may be applicable remains an
open question because it shares similar policy concerns with the rate
regulation jurisprudence. In particular, the recognition that there is a need
to balance government's need for a certain degree of leeway to be able to
function with government action that may adversely affect the value of
private property because the power to regulate can become the power to
take. 1
The third category is physical invasions of property which are
regarded as per se takings when the "character of the governmental action"
is a permanent physical occupation of property, without regard to the first
and second factors above." 2 In the access pricing scenario, the argument is
that access requires use of the ILEC's physical property, the collocation of
equipment, or the sending of electromagnetic signals through the owner's
107. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Eastern
Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 523-24 (1998) (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (citation omitted)).
108. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
109. Local Competition Provisions, supra note 2, para. 670; Deregulatory Takings 2,
supra note 89, at 945-46.
110. Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1435, 1456 (2000); Chen, supra note 90, at 1558-59.
111. Spulber & Yoo, supra note 85, at 944.
112. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982).
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network, each of which amounts to a physical invasion.'1 3 However, the
Supreme Court has held that it is "inappropriate to treat cases involving
physical takings as controlling precedents for the evaluation of a claim
[involving] a 'regulatory taking,"' making the physical invasions category
inapplicable to an access regime." 4
The Supreme Court in Verizon has intimated that the rate-setting
category of takings is applicable to telecommunications regulation once
there is a result rather than just a mere method. While the possibility of
administrative law providing a remedy to ILECs remains slim-due to the
accountability abyss created by Chevron deference and congressional
delegation-ILECs will continue to pursue constitutional law remedies
such as those provided by the Takings Clause. The rate-setting category of
takings may allow the regulated firm to recover only its reasonable costs of
providing the service in question or be entitled to earn a rate of return on
investment comparable to the return that investors expect to receive before
committing funds to investments having commensurate risks. 1 5 Although
receiving "just compensation" may equate to a low return on investment or
recovery of costs, it will continue to be pursued by ILECs whenever it
amounts to a better outcome than receiving a TELRIC-based rate set by a
state commission.
However, the ability of the Takings Clause to protect against
confiscations of property and, incidentally, to ensure regulator
accountability requires that the jurisprudence be updated for the current
regulatory environment. The current jurisprudence sets the bar for a just
rate at a low level by focusing on the impact of the rate on the entire
regulated enterprise." 6 Future cases should question whether such an
approach is appropriate in a deregulated environment-where some
telecommunications services are regulated but others are not-so that
113. Local Competition Provisions, supra note 2, paras. 670, 740; DEREGULATORY
TAKINGS 1, supra note 89, at 237-40; Spulber & Yoo, supra note 85, at 959.
114. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
323 (2002) (footnote omitted).
115. DEREGULATORY TAKINGS 1, supra note 89, at 276; Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete
Compensation for Takings, I I N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 110, 125-26 (2002).
116. A taking arose when the rate endangered a firm's survival, prevented successful
operations (i.e., an inability to maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to
compensate its investors for the risks assumed) or failed to give a reasonable rate of return
on equity given the risks of the regime. See Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope, 320 U.S. 591,
605 (1944); Dusquene Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 312 (1989).
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losses in one area cannot be offset by altering rates in another area." 7 In a
competitive environment, aggressive competitors in the market in which
the subsidy is drawn (prices are increased above economic cost to support
some other activity) can price below the ILEC and engage in "cream-
skimming" so as to thwart any cross-subsidization." 8 However, there may
still be explicit subsidies (e.g., universal service)" 9 or regulatory benefits
(e.g., having the line of business restrictions lifted if ILECs meet certain
criteria) 120 that complicate any determination of the total effect of
regulation. The Supreme Court has battled with the appropriate property
denominator in the other takings categories and in determining how to
classify a temporary deprivation. 121 The Supreme Court needs to
redetermine the appropriate property denominator to which the rate is
applied. The denominator could be the network element subject to access
or a combination of network elements that make up a marketable service.
The essential point is that the takings jurisprudence must reflect the
economic reality of a deregulating telecommunications market rather than
the extinct fully regulated private monopoly.
V. CONCLUSION
The Telecommunications Act deals with access pricing through
ambiguous provisions that rely on the chameleonic term "cost" to achieve
the equally imprecise "just and reasonable rates." When combined with
Chevron deference the FCC is given an enormous amount of discretion as
to how it deploys its expertise and decides policy questions. To some extent
117. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. GTE Northwest, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1170 (D.
Or. 1999); Theodore V. Morrison, Jr. et al., Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the
Regulatory Contract, 4 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 2, 40-41 (Fall 1997), at
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v4si/speech2.html#h3.
118. DEREGULATORY TAKINGS 1, supra note 89, at 34; Williams, supra note 90, at 1001.
Cross-subsidization may also lead to claims of anti-competitive conduct like predatory
pricing or monopolization.
119. 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(4) (2000) requires all providers of telecommunications services
to contribute to universal service so that ILECs who actually provide universal service will
receive offsetting subsidies from CLECs that do not.
120. Hazlett Comment, supra note 6, at 225; DEREGULATORY TAKINGS 1, supra note 89,
278-81.
121. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978); Andrus v.
Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 496-97, 515-16 (1987); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 325-27 (2002). The clearest recognition of the importance of the
proper scope of the property interest is in Justice Scalia's footnote 7 in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992), where he acknowledges that
"regrettably, the rhetorical force of our 'deprivation of all economically feasible use' rule is
greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear the 'property interest' against
which the loss of value is to be measured."
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such discretion is necessary because of the difficulties in setting out precise
guidelines ex ante and the need to be responsive to changing conditions in
the telecommunications sector. However, the need for discretion must be
balanced with ensuring that the FCC remains an accountable regulator. The
separation of powers between the judiciary and Congress requires that
judicial review be limited to ensuring that a regulator complies with the
legislative mandate set out in its governing legislation. As a result, a
regulator such as the FCC can only be effectively monitored through
judicial review when Congress amends the Telecommunications Act to set
out clear objectives and addresses the important issue of access pricing.
If legislative guidance is not forthcoming, then constitutional
protections such as the Takings Clause will be more frequently invoked due
to Chevron deference and congressional delegation making administrative
law remedies ineffective, and the limits on judicial review being inapposite.
Verizon has confirmed the applicability of the rate-setting takings
jurisprudence to access pricing. The Takings Clause is therefore available
as a mechanism for seeking review of TELRIC results (not methodology)
and a determination of whether the actual price received by an ILEC falls
below the floor that is "just compensation" and therefore amounts to a
constitutionally impermissible rate.
Fostering competition is a legitimate political goal, but it should not
be able to be pursued at all costs, in particular, at the expense of regulator
accountability. Congress needs to revisit the Telecommunications Act to
provide clearer guidance for the FCC and reviewing courts. The Supreme
Court needs to ensure that clear language is given effect, and it needs to
update its rate-setting takings jurisprudence to bring it in line with the new
era of deregulation. Through these changes, telecommunications can
realize its potential to make a significant contribution to economic
advancement without violating principles of democratic government.
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